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Reclamations made in navigable waters present old but still perplex-
ing questions. For example, may the government, for the improvement
of navigation or other public purpose, create a new front estate between
the original riparian owner and the navigable channel? May this be
done without compensation? And to whom does the reclaimed area
belong?
The answers are various and conflicting. In most cases, both the
question of compensation and the question of ownership have been made
to turn upon the seisin of the soil formerly underlying the water.
Where, following the strict doctrine of Lord Hale, a technical fee in
soil below high water mark is deemed to reside in the state, the solution
has generally been in favor of the absolute right to reclaim submerged
soil so as to bring into existence a new front estate, without compensa-
tion to the owner of the old.' And the improvement, it is said, need
not be in aid of navigation. Any public purpose will do. 2  Where, on
the contrary, the riparian owner is regarded as having either the fee in
'Sage v. Mayor of New York (897) 154 N. Y. 6i, 76,.47 N. E. lo96, iioo.
2 Home v. Commonwealth (igoo) 202 Mass. 422, 435, 89 N. E. 124, i29; Corrs. of
Lincoln Park v. Fahrney (1gII) 250 Ill. 256, 257, 95 N. E. 194, 195. Some cases
draw a distinction between improvements in aid of navigation and improvements
for other public purposes equally within the competence of the improving authority.
In re New York (igoi) 168 N. Y. 134, 144, 61 N. E 158, I61. In Conger v.
Pierce County (1921) ii6 Wash. 27, 198 Pac. 377, a navigable tidal river was
deepened and straightened for the stated purpose of correcting a tendency to over-
flow its banks and injure roads, bridges, and other public property. The current
was thus thrown against land previously protected from erosion by a bend.
Counties making the improvement under express legislative authority were held
liable for the resulting washing away of the bank. The State Constitution required
compensation for property damaged for public use. But if riparian land must
suffer the consequences of a lawful change in the stream, there was no injuria.
Hence the decision was made to turn upon the nature of the public purpose. On
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the soil to low water mark or some qualified right of property or user
therein, the answer is otherwise.3
The inadequacy of this method of treatment becomes apparent when
it is considered that the ultimate right and final power to make improve-
ments in navigable waters rests, not in the several states, but in the
Federal Government, whereas the ownership of the submerged soil is
exclusively a question of state law, and in no instance resides in the
Federal Government within the limits of any state. Only in the case
where the improvement is made by the same government which has the
fee, is the solution grounded upon ownership clear and free from
embarrassment. Even in that case difficulty arises as soon as the law
of the state owning the fee concedes a general right of access to the
riparian owner.
So long as the whole question was regarded from the standpoint of
seisin, the improving state, on the one hand, 'and the riparian owner, on
the other, were treated simply as abutting landowners whose boundary
was the mathematical line of ordinary high water. In this view it was
not difficult to sustain the state's right to cut off access, because access
was not a right.
4
The riparian owner's exclusive right to embark from his own land,
or to use the natural shore down to high water mark as a landing place,
was said to belong to him, not because his land adjoined navigable
waters, but because no one else could enjoy those rights without entering
upon his land and thus becoming a trespasser. Whatever rights the
owner has are negative. In short, access from littoral or riparian land
is not a legal incident of ownership of stream-washed land, but an acci-
dent. Upon this view, also, the state's ownership of the soil under
navigable water is not regarded as a technical title intended to sustain
and support the public rights of navigation and fishery, but as a true
proprietary right identical with ordinary property in land. The state
may, therefore, not only destroy the owner's access, but in so doing
create a new and valuable property for itself.5 This view has the beauty
of simplicity, and as pointed out, when the state makes the improvement
on its own submerged soil in front of an owner to whom it denies any
this point, it is hard to reconcile with Cudbbins v. Mississippi River Commr. (1916)
241 U. S. 351, 36 Sup. Ct. 671 ; Jackson v. United States (1913) 230 U. S. I, 33
Sup. Ct. Iion; Hughes v. United States (1913) 230 U. S. 24, 33 Sup. Ct 1O19; or
Bedford v. United States (1903) 192 U. S. 2,7, 24 Sup. Ct. 238. There seems to
be little difference between preventing a river from overflowing and injuring roads
and bridges and preventing it from overflowing other adjacent property. As the
stream's 'tendency' is not clearly described, one cannot say whether the case itself
might not be distinguished on the principle of defensive works against 'accidental
and extraordinary' overflow stressed in the Cubbins case. Its interest here lies
in the point about public purpose.
'Mayor of Baltimore v. St. Agnes' Hospital (1877) 48 Md. 419.
' Gould v. Hudson River Ry. (3852) 6 N. Y. 522, 541.
'Cf. Shively v. Bowlby (1894) 152 U. S. I, II, 14 Sup. Ct. 548, 557.
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right of access, there is none to dispute its power to interpose a new
front estate without compensation.
A further consequence of the denial of the right of access is, of
course, that any wharf or similar structure, irrespective of its effect
on navigation, is, when unlicensed, a purpresture or encroachment
upon the sovereign's property. The difficulty in reconciling this con-
ception with the actual custom and practice of freely constructing
wharves, subject only to the public right of navigation and the govern-
mental protection thereof, has led very widely to the breakdown of the
strict purpresture doctrine and the concession of a private right of access
distinct from the public right of navigation, although subordinate to it
and to the measures taken by the government for its protection and
promotion.6
Upon the question, then, as to the creation of a new front estate,
difficulty begins as soon as access is regarded as a right. How can the
existence of this right of access be reconciled with a right in the state,
not merely to impair its enjoyment indirectly as an incident of the
improvement of navigation,7 but to take it away altogether by making
for itself a new and valuable water front, carrying the exclusive right
of access? Or, stated otherwise, can the admitted right to improve
become the source of a new right of property, the creation of which is
incompatible with the conceded existence of another right? Stated
in terms of cases, how may the doctrine of Sage v. Mayor of New York"
be harmonized with Lyon v. Fishmongers' CompanyP
II
What follows is offered upon the assumption that access from riparian
or littoral land to navigation is a right incident to the ownership of such
land.
It should perhaps be stated in passing that in so far as ideas other than
those connected with seisin operated to deny the existence of a right
of access, the courts seem to have gone upon the ground that to concede
such a right would mean that the owner of the adjacent soil had a claim
to the natural flow of the river with which the state had no right to
interfere by any erections in the bed of the river. As this would result
in stripping the state of power to improve the navigation of the river
by any structure affecting the natural flow of the stream, the concession
of a right of access was regarded as tantamount to a negation of the
acknowledged power to improve or facilitate navigation.' 0
The fallacy in this reasoning is obvious. A right of access is not to
be confounded with a claim to the natural flow of the stream. It is
' Brookhaven v. Smith (i9o7) 188 N. Y. 74, 78, 8o N. E. 665, 666.
'Ricn ey v. N. Y. & N. E. Ry. (1892) 133 N. Y. 79, 86, 30 N. E. 654, 655.
'Supra note i.
(1876, H. L.) L. R. i A. C. 662.
Gould v. Hudson River Rl. (1852) 6 N. Y. 522, 543.
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simply a right to get to the stream as a highway in whatsoever condition
* the stream may be, either naturally or as affected by artificial structures.
It, like every other right of access, is subordinate to the power of the
government to make the highway what its name denotes, that is to say,
an adequate instrumentality for the passage of men and goods. The
right of access to a highway, as such, gives no right to the perpetuation
of any given condition of the highway. Neither, on the other hand, is
the right necessarily destroyed because alterations in the condition of the
highway may affect or impair its utilization.
Assuming, then, that access is a right, we pass to consider its nature
and its relation to the powers of government.
Iii
The right of access is a right of property. 1 It arises as an incident
of the natural location of land in contact with navigable water.' 2  It is
a right, therefore, which in America is good against the sovereign as
well as against private individuals.
In the same waterway, however, there is a general or public right of
navigation-a jus publicum. The right of access, therefore,. cannot be
so exercised as to destroy the right of navigation. They must co-exist.
Now, in a certain sense, and to A certain degree, every exercise of the
right of access must interfere with full freedom of navigation. Any
wharf, for example, must extend over water which is navigable by some
sort of craft.' 3  It does not follow from that, however, either that such
an impediment must be deemed an infringement of the right of naviga-
tion; or, if it were, that the individual interfered with, being affected
only in common with the rest of the community, would have a legal
remedy.
A power must be lodged somewhere to vindicate the right of naviga-
tion and to determine the limits and conditions of the exercise of the
,respective rights. This power to conserve the right of navigation and
to determine the line between it and the right of access is lodged in the
political state, the sovereign, and, in our system of divided powers, the
ultimate and final exercise of it falls, as part of the commerce power, to
the Federal Government. 14 Thus over against the right of access stands
1 1Norwalk v. Podinore (1913) 86 Conn. 658, 86 AUt. 582.
Lyon v. Fishmongers' Co., supra note 9; Saunders v. N. Y. C. & H. Ry.
(1894) 144 N. Y. 75, 38 N. E. 992; Garitee v. Baltinore (879) 53 Md. 422;
Parkersburg, etc. v. Parkersburg (1883) lO7 U. S. 691, 2 Sup. Ct 732.
' Hale, de Portibus Maris, cap. VII; Langdon v. Mayor of New York (1883)
93 N, Y. 229; The Wharf Case (1831, Md.) 3 Bland's Ch. 361, 369.
"Scranton v. Wheeler (29oo) 179 U. S. 141, 163, 22 Sup. Ct 48, 57; Philadel-
phia Company v. Stimnson (1912) 223 U. S. 6o5, 634, 32 Sup. Ct. 340, 350; United
States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company (1913) 229 U. S. 53, 62, 33
Sup. Ct 667, 671; Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison (1915) 237 U. S.
251, 268, 35 Sup. Ct. 551, 557; Willink v. United States (1916) 24o U. S. 572, 58o,
36 Sup. Ct. 422, 424.
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the right of the sovereign to superintend, control, and improve naviga-
tion. This is not a right of property, but a power of government. It
is the jus regium of Hale's threefold classification.15
The right of access, since it is one exercised in or over the waterway,
is subject, in its exercise, to the sovereign's continuing power to regulate
and control navigation."6 Even where such a right is most clearly
recognized, any particular mode of exercising it must be in subordination
to the sovereign right or power of navigation-control.'
7
Since navigation-control is a governmental power, the manner of its
exercise is in essence not a justiciable but a political question. In other
words, the mode of exercise, so long as it is within the scope of the
power, rests in the uncontrolled judgment of the government.' 8
Regarded from the viewpoint of its exercise, this power is plainly
of two kinds: (i) negative and (2) positive. In the exercise of the
negative side qf the power of navigation-control, the government may,
in its discretion, hold that structures of any particular kind, devised as
a means of access, interfere with or obstruct navigation. It may, for
example, forbid, by general law, the erection of wharves altogether.' 9
Or, having laid down a rule in general terms, it may delegate to execu-
tive officers authority to prescribe the extent and material of wharves,
declaring all structures in contravention of such regulations to be
nuisances and subject to removal.20  This may be done although it may
thereby destroy what, in respect of any particular riparian owner, is
the only feasible mode of access. This is so because, as between the
state and a private individual, upon the question what is an improper
or unreasonable interference with navigation, not the judgment of a
court but the judgment of the government alone is decisive. This is
" This obvious but sometimes unappreciated fact is sharply accentuated by the
whole power's being placed in the Federal Government. It was incisively expressed
many centuries ago by the head of a very different sort of government, Louis the
German, in a rescript concerning the great rivers of the Empire: CUjUSCUMQUE
POTESTATIS sunt litora nostra tanzen est regalis. Cited by Vallotton, Du Rgihne
lurid. des Cours d'eau intern. de I'Europe Centrale (1913) Rev. Droit Intern. 2
serie, t. XV, p. 271.
" This power obviously must be exercised with a view not only to present necessi-
ties, but to the anticipated needs of the future. Ecotomy Light Co. v. United
States (1921) 256 U. S. 113, 123, 41 Sup. Ct. 409, 413. Cf. v. fhering, Geist des
R. R. (4te Aufl. 188o) IIL, (I) s. 364.
"Lane v. Harbor Connnissioners (1898) 7o Conn. 685, 698, 4o Atl. io58, 1O62;
Bradslaw v. Duluth Co. (1892) 52 Minn. 59, 65, 53 N. W. io66, io68.
" United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Water Power Company, supra note 14;
Union Bridge Co. v. U. S. (1907) 204 U. S. 364, 386, 27 Sup. Ct. 367, 374;
Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & B. Bridge Co. (855, U. S.) 18 How. 421, 430;
Miller v. Mayor of New York (1876, C. C. 2d) 13 Blatchf. 469; Frost v. Wash-
ington County Ry. (19Ol) 96 Me. 76, 5I Atl. 8o6.
"Hedges v. W. Shore Ry. (1896) 15o N. Y.. I5O, 44 N. E. 691; Cobb. v.
Commissioners of Lincoln Park (1903) 202 Ill. 427, 67 N. E. 5; Murphy v.
Bullock (1897) 2o R. I. 35, 37 Atl. 348.
2" Cf. Act of Sept. 19, 189o (26 Stat. at L. 426, 454).
YALE LAW JOURNAL
not a denial of the right of access."' It means only that it may happen
that, in regulating the exercise of the right of access under the power
to control navigation, effective exercise of the right may be destroyed.
The power is usually exercised by prescribing what amounts to a
common rule, as for instance, the fixing by statute, or more commonly
by some executive agency to which the power is delegated, of bulkhead
or pierhead lines.2 2  The establishment of such lines obviously amounts
to laying down rules with respect to the extent to which artificial means
of access may be constructed. The drawing of such a bulkhead or pier-
head line, whether done directly by statute or by an executive officer, is
a function of government and not subject to judicial review.2 3  One
riparian owner cannot complain, except to the executive government,
that the line in front of his land is less advantageous than the line in
front of the adjoining land.2 4  In a word, the right of access is simply
one of those rights which can be enjoyed only in subordination to an
acknowledged power of the government to conserve and protect a
general public interest. The execution of this power is not judicially
reviewable.
Only when the power- has not been otherwise exercised, that is, when
it comes to abating a particular structure in waters where no regular
rule has been laid down, can the judicial power be invoked to decide
the question what is, or is not, an obstruction to navigation. Of
course, as between private individuals, where no rule has been prescribed
by the state, the question of obstruction becomes a question of fact.
.The same principles govern the exercise of the positive side of the
power of navigation-control. The government may not only regulate
the extent to which other persons may make artificial structures in the
water, but it may, in the pursuance of its power, make'structures of its
own, or authorize them to be made in aid of commerce by others.
25
And here, again, the extent and method of making the improvement
are beyond judicial control. If the structure, for example, a sea-wall,
cuts off access, the result is but an incident of the exercise of an
acknowledged power and, therefore, no legal wrong. The loss of access
is damnum but not injuria. 6
' Bradshaw v. Duluth Co., .spra note 17.
2Act of March 3. i899 (3o Stat. at L. 1121, si) ; Act of Feb. 20, 1900 (31
Stat. at L. 31, 32).
Greenleaf-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Garrison (I915) 237 U. S. 25i, 262, 35 Sup.
Ct. 55i, 555; Willink v. United States (i916) 240 U. S. 572, 581, 36 Sup. Ct 422,
424.
4 At least, in the absence of manifest bad faith. Where, for example, the
proceedings themselves disclosed that harbor lines were established in order that a
new 'expensive and sightly' bridge should not be marred by buildings on either
side, this bald declaration of an ulterior purpose was taken as proof that the power
was not exercised in good faith for the interest of navigation or any other recog-
nized public use. Farist Steel Co. v. City of Bridgeport (i89i) 6o Conn. 278,
292, 22 Atl. 561, 566.
2 sNewport & C. Bridge Co. v. United States (I88I) IO5 U. S. 470.
"Gibson v. United States (1897) 166 U. S. 2i6s, 276, 7 Sup. Ct. 578, 580.
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IV
But what are the limits of this doctrine? Does it then follow that, in
the course of or in connection with such an improvement, a new and
valuable estate may be created in which inheres the access formerly
enjoyed by the riparian owner? Will not the latter naturally object
that, in order to be treated as damnurn absque injuria, the loss inflicted
upon the riparian estate should be limited to the natural consequences
of the exercise of the acknowledged power? If pushed beyond those
consequences, will it not become an independent injury? Will it not to
that extent become an act beyond the scope of the power?
The power of the sovereign to improve the river, it is objected,
cannot extend to the creation, for its benefit and without compensation,
of a new fast land estate withiri the space between the actual improve-
ment (a sea-wall, for illustration) and the original shore, for the reason
that the power to improve extends Pnly to the improvement as such,
that is to say the sea-wall and its normal consequences. Transfer of
access to the new estate does not follow from the construction of the
sea-wall. The riparian owner still has such access as he can get not-
withstanding the wall. The new front estate erected between him and
the water, to which estate access now attaches, is not referable to the
power to improve the navigation of the stream, for the creation of such
an estate is not a natural consequence of the exercise of such a power.
The interposition of the new estate must be referred to something else,
and it can be referred only to the end which it really accomplishes,
namely, the transferring of the right of access, which is property, from
the original to a new owner. In short, it is a transfer, that is, a taking
of property, and it is immaterial whether that property, namely, access,
is transferred to a stranger by granting the intervening estate or is
retained by the sovereign for itself.
Thus it comes about that, as a counter-blast against the claim to take
away access without compensation, the riparian owner, in order to
preserve his access, is led to lay claim to the reclaimed area which would
otherwise separate him from navigation.
V
It will probably be well to have in mind the forms in which, owing to
the division of sovereignty, the question presents itself: (i) Where
the improvement is made by one government and the technical fee of the
submerged soil is in the private proprietor. (2) Where the improve-
ment is made by the government which has also the technical fee in the
submerged soil; for example, an improvement made by the Federal
Government in the District of Columbia, or in a territory before state-
hood. Or an improvement such as that made by New York in the
Hudson River. (3) Where the improvement is made by one govern-
ment and the technical fee of the submerged soil is in another govern-
ment; for example, an improvement made by the United States in a
state like New York, Iowa, or Alabama.
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The first case is plain. Whatever practical impairment of access
may result from the improvement does not work any transfer of the
right of access. The original riparian estate continues the front estate
and neither the federal nor the state government can lay claim to any
filled land between the old shore line and the new. It is, therefore, the
second and the third cases only which give rise to controversy. Yet it
is to be noticed that in the first case, the power fo make the improve-
ment is just as plenary as in the other two. Why, then, should both the
reclaimed land and the right of access pass without compensation to
the government when, as in the second case, it makes an improvement
by virtue of the same power on submerged land in which it happens to
have the technical fee? The answer given is: "Because it had that fee."
This is but admitting that the governmental power to improve naviga-
tion cannot in itself be a legal cause for the transfer of access.
The answer, however, seems to be doubtful because it refers an effect
to a cause not related to it. Upon the conceded premise that access is
recognized as a property right, ownership of the technical fee of the
submerged soil did not carry of itself any right to make such soil into
fast land at the expense of the existing riparian estate. The technical
fee in the soil while submerged was itself subject to the right of access
from the existing shore to the common highway just as the right of
access, in turn, was subject to the governmental power to improve navi-
gation. Passage over the water and submerged soil for the purpose
of access is just as consistent with title in the state as passage for the
purpose of navigation.2 7 It does not seem possible to invoke the techni-
cal fee as a justification for taking away that to which it was itself
subject.
VI
We have already seen that there are but two things upon which a
translation of the right of access might be predicated: the technical
fee in the soil under the stream, and the power to control and improve
its navigation. Neither seems to serve. The technical fee f.ils because
it was itself subject to the right of access over the stream and its bed.
The navigation power fails because its exercise in no wise involves or
requires transfer of access. Since neither separately confers the right,
can they have that effect simply because they co-exist in the same legal
persona? To make use of their accidental conjunction to transfer the
right of access from the old to the new front estate does not weaken
the concession that the new result is not brought about by the exercise
" Boulo v. New Orleans M. T. Ry. (1876) 55 Ala. 480, 493; Mobile Trans. Co.
v. Mobile (1907) 153 Ala. 409, 44 So. 976. This view of the fundus fee, whether
in state or private party, is nowise inconsistent with the recognition of other
substantial rights inherent in ownership. Matter of City of New York (915)
216 N. Y. 67, 77, iio N. E. 176, 7). The exercise of such proprietary rights is
simply subordinated to the normal user of the waterway by the public and the
riparians.
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of the only power which the government had in the premises-the power
to improve navigation. It is thrown back, as before, upon that technical
ownership of the submerged soil which carries no power, and especially
no power to cut off the right of access over itself. The conclusion
would seem to be that whether the intervening area goes to the federal
or to the state government the right of access incident to the former
riparian estate is taken from the owner and ought to be paid for.
28
Before considering how this is to be worked out, it remains to consider
one other form of the argument for the government claim to have the
land and the access. It runs thus: Access may lawfully be impaired
by an improvement of the stream. Such impairment may extend to the
point of extinction. The owner of the riparian estate, therefore, has
nothing to complain of when access is thus extinguished. Access being
thus extinguished by the improvement, it is no concern of his, then, that
the new front estate, also resulting from the improvement, has the
right of access incident to its situation. In other words, the access
extinguished by the improvement and the access incident to the new
estate are two different things.
This reasoning suffices to answer the riparian owner's claim
to own, after reclamation, land which, before reclamation, was never in
his seisin.2 9  But as applied to access, it seems to beg the question.
The former riparian owner, indeed, cannot complain of the extinction
of access by the improvement. But, as we have already seen, access is
not really extinguished by the improvement, but by the claimed owner-
ship of the intervening area. It is true that access may be impaired to
the point of extinction, but only by virtue and in exercise of the power
of navigation-control, not by virtue of ownership of the submerged
soil. An effect which does not result from the exercise of the power of
navigation-control cannot properly be ascribed to the power. Destrtic-:
tion of access does not here result from the exercise of that power
because, notwithstanding the improvement, the owner of the riparian
estate would still enjoy whatever access might, in fact, be had from his
land, were it not for the claim of ownership.
' The New York Court of Appeals, reaffirming the state's right to create a new
front estate without compensation for the promotion of navigation and commerce,
denied its right to do so for the construction of a "speedway" from which com-
mercial traffic was excluded. In re New York, supra note 2. It is hard to recon-
cile this case with Sage v. Mayor of lNew -York, supra note i. In both, the dis-
cussion is much concerned with the state's title to the submerged soil. There does
not seem to be much difference between using the technical fee to raise- up a new
water front and using it to build a speedway.
It was said, indeed, that a speedway was inconsistent with the state's trust for
the preservation of common rights in the stream. The point obscured is that
making a new front estate, whether for wharf or for speedway, is not.an exercise
of any governmental power or 'trust' in respect of the stream. In both cases, the
effect on the upland owner is to take away his access, not for any waterway.
purpose, but for the enrichment of the person who gets the new-made land.
' Marine Ry. & Coal Co. v. United Sitates (1920) 49 D. C. 285, 265 Fed. 437,
(92) 42 Sup. Ct 32.
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VII
Let us now look at the matter from the other side, namely, that of
ownership. Where the filling is upon soil of which the improving
government owns the technical fee, to whom does the reclaimed land
belong? The former riparian owner, defending himself against the
consequences of being thrown back into the interior without compensa-
tion, naturally claims the land as his own.
(A) It cannot belong to him, however, for these reasons: (i) The
area occupied by the improvement was never part of his tenement.
He had no right in this area before, and manifestly can have no right in
it now. (2) Deprivation of the right of access from one piece of land
is not a grant of an estate in another piece of land. Injury to one
estate cannot create a title to another. (3) Nor would the ownership
of the reclaimed land be a just and true measure of the value of the
access destroyed by the improvement, for, in the very nature of things,
the less the value of the right of access, the greater the area of reclaimed
land accruing to the upland owner.30
(B) If then, in this case, the reclaimed land does not belong to the
riparian owner, manifestly it must belong to the government which
owned the same area when submerged. 31 It is'a simple instance of the
principle: Sciendum est eius manere cuius fuit.
So much for the bare question of the ownership of the soil. We have
not, however, yet arrived at a solution of the problem considered as a
whole. Several alternatives present themselves: (a) the original
front estate might be regarded as having been increased in invitum by
the addition of the new-made land, in which case the riparian owner
nof only retains access but gets new soil; or (b) the original front
estate might be regarded as retaining access over the intervening made
land, the fee of which is in him who had the technical fee in the sub-
merged soil; or (c) the right of access might be regarded as having
been taken from the old front estate and transferred to the new front
estate, in which case it must, of course, be compensated for. No one
of these alternatives is free from theoretical as well as practical difficul-
ties. The first is unduly generous to the private owner. The second,
however good in theory, is utterly impracticable because it renders the
new land useless in order to preserve for the private owner a technical
"'A familiar mode of river and harbor improvement consists in confining the
channel by building a sea-wall or revetment along its edge. The navigable portion
of the stream is then deepened by dredging and the 'spoil' or material removed
from the bed is deposited behind the wall. In this way, the flats or shallows
between navigation, as defined by the wall, and the original upland shore are
filled in parS passit with the deepening of the channel and so converted into fast
land. Obviously the greater the stretch of shoal water in front of any upland.
parcel, the greater the area reclaimed between it and the wall. Thus, two estates
having equal frontage on a given stream would receive land in inverse ratio to the
value of their respective rights of access.
' Marine Ry. & Coal Co. v. United States, supra note 29.
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right extremely inconvenient to exercise. The application of the third
would be found embarrassing where the improvement is made by the
Federal Government and the technical fee is in a state. It would
amount to conferring upon the state a new property having access, for
the loss of which the United States would have to compensate the former
owner. And upon the same state of facts, the second alternative would
be almost equally embarrassing, for the United States would, in effect,
convert the state's submerged soil into fast land and grant the user
thereof to the riparian owner.
The doctrinal difficulties are equally great. Solution (a) cannot
be supported on any established legal principle. Appeal is made to
only two: Alluvion, which is manifestly inapplicable; and an unau-
thorized extension of a front estate by a private stranger. But in
our case, the improvement is public and lawful. There can be no reason
to enrich the riparian owner at the public expense when that result is
not demanded by any positive rule.
In addition to the objection that it destroys the economic utilization
of the new water front by condemning it to a perpetual servitude in
favor of an interior estate without an equivalent benefit to the latter,
the second solution (b) conflicts with established principle in the case
where the state and not the Federal Government has the fee, in that it
would permit a stranger to the title to create an easement. A funda-
mental principle such as that ought not to be violated to accomplish such
an economically detrimental result.
The third solution is the only one that seems to promise relief. Here,
it must be admitted, we return again to the notion of seisin. But we
return to it, not in oider to justify taking away the economic value of
land in which the government had no seisin, but in order to avoid giving
away land in which it unquestionably had seisin and which it has con-
verted into a new form at its own expense. This much, principle seems
to require. But principle does not require us to do more. Ownership
of the new land does not here necessarily carry with it the right of
access. For the land when submerged was something altogether differ-
ent from the land as reclaimed. The submerged land had no access and
no right of access. To borrow the convenient terminology of the civil-
ians, the land was then in usu publico; it is now in patrinonio populi.
Then the state had "a technical fee" under the waterway; now the land
is withdrawn from the waterway and may be sold at discretion.3 2
In raising this area above the water level and changing its character,
then, the government has really done three things: (i) It has made an
improvement in navigation. (2) It has converted a given area of soil
' "So 'gehbren' auch die res publicae dem Staat und, wenn sie dem Gemeinge-
brauch entzogen sind, fallen auch sie unter die Form des gewbhnlichen Eigenthums,
daraus folgt aber nicht in Mindesten dass das Geh6ren, das 'populi universatis
esse,' schon friliher diese Form an sich tragen miisse." v. Jhering, Geist des
rbti.schen Reclits, (4te Aufl.) IV. s. 362, Abm. 476.
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under water in which it had but a technical estate, into a corresponding
area of fast land in which its dominion is freed from the uses which
formerly clogged it. (3) And it has, by force of this conversion,
deprived the original riparian owner of his right of access.
Why should not each of these things have its own proper legal conse-
quences? The navigation improvement is beyond the power of any
private individual to touch. The new land belongs to the government
simply because, treated as a portion of the earth's surface, the same area
already belonged to the government. But the access which is now an
incident of the new land is really not an incident of the land which the
government owned, but an incident of the land of the riparian owner.
It has been transferred from the one to the other by the force of the
conversion of one kind of property into property of a totally different
kind. In short, it has been taken from one and given to another. It
cannot be said that even this solution is free from all difficulty. For it
will doubtless be pointed out that where access is impaired short of
extinction, the owner is entitled to no compensation whatever for the
diminution in the value of his property, whereas access totally destroyed
by the interposition of a new front estate will here be fully compensated
for.
Such a result is regrettable, but it is not without precedent. Incon-
sistencies of that sort seem to be the natural spawn of the doctrine of
"taking." The difficulty is so common in the law of eminent domain,
that a special metaphysic is often devised to escape from it.3 There is
always, however, a simple remedy, which the legislature is competent to
afford if it will-compensation for property injuriously affected by
public improvements. 4 Before we follow our British cousins-on this
path of justice and fair dealing, it will be necessary to get away some-
what from the current belief that the burden of every public improve-
ment ought to be cast as far as possible upon the individuals who
happen to stand in some close physical relation to it, regardless of the
question whether the benefit to them is in reality greater than that to the
rest of the community.
This solution, moreover, carries its own antidote. It removes the
temptation to damage the riparian owner unnecessarily. Where the
improvement is made solely with a view to promoting navigation, and
without an eye to the acquisition of valuable water front without com-
pensation, the riparian owner is not likely to suffer "the consequences
' Compare United States v. Lynah (19o3) 188 U. S. 445, 465, 471, 23 Sup. Ct.
349, 355, 357; United States v. Welch (191o) 217 U. S. 333, 339, 30 Sup. Ct. 527;
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States (1892) 148 U. S. 312, 336, 13
Sup. Ct. 622, 63o; and United States v. Cress (97)243 U. S. 316, 327, 37
Sup. Ct 380, 384; with Bedford v. United States (19o4) 192 U. S. 217, 225,
24 Sup. Ct. 238, 240; and Jacksoi v. United States (1913) 230 U. S. 1, 23, 33
Sup. Ct IOli, lO19.
"
4Duke of Buccleuch v. Metrop. Bd. of WForks (1872, H. L.) L. R. 5 Eng. &
Ir. A. C. 418.
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of a public improvement" in greater measure than the improvement
really requires.
To repeat, a just solution would appear to be: The area reclaimed
belongs in full ownership to the holder of the technical fee in the same
area while submerged, but the right of access incident to the old front
estate must be regarded as appropriated, taken, and annexed to the new
land. The former owner is, therefore, to be compensated for its value.
This view, it is submitted, receives some aid from the reasoning by
which, in United States v. Cress,35 Mr. Justice Pitney held a diminu-
tion in the value of land affected by a public improvement equivalent
to the taking of an interest to the extent of the diminution. There, a
"permanent liability to intermittent overflow," depreciating the value
of land, was treated not as an injury to the land,38 but as an -actual
appropriation of it, and hence as a taking requiring constitutional com-
pensation and also warranting recovery as upon an implied contract to
pay the price. To the objection that the owner still had his property,
it was said that "if any substantial enjoyment of the land still remains
to the owner, it may be treated as a partial instead of a total divesting
of his property in the land." And the owner might be compensated,
upon the analogy of the condemnation of an interest less than a fee, to
the extent of the right and interest necessary to effectuate the public
purpose. In that case there was, of course, an actual "invasion" of the
land itself, but the reasoning does not turn upon it. Moreover, United
States v. Welc, 37 goes to show that that is not absolutely indispensable,
for there compensation was allowed for the destruction of an easement
by physical action on the servient, not the dominant, tenement. In
United States v. Cress3 8 also, recovery was allowed for the destruction
of the power of a mill dam in a non-navigable creek by the backing up of
waters resulting from an improvement of a navigable stream further
down. The right of the owner of the land under the creek to have the
water flow away unobstructed was called-a right existing "by the law
of nature as an inseparable part of the land."39  The right of a riparian
owner on a navigable stream, not to the unchanged flow of the stream,
but to get to the stream itself, would seem to have quite as firm a founda-
tion, and to be just as much an inseparable part of the land. The point
of both cases is that the destruction, by the improvement, of value
normally inherent in the land is treated as a transfer of property to the
extent of the value lost.
It seems but a step from the doctrine of those cases to the view here
suggested. While we have no invasion, there is an additional element
which may also serve to turn the scale on the side of appropriation.
'Supra note 33.
" Otis Co. v. Ludlow Co. (i9o6) 261 U. S. 140, '53, 156, 26 Sup. Ct. 353, 354,
356.
"Supra note 33.
' Supra note 33.
243 U. S. 316, 330, 37 Sup. Ct. 380, 386.
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The government does not merely deprive the owner of something in
order to effectuate a governmental purpose as in these cases, but it
actually enriches itself by the acquisition of a definite beneficial interest
having money value. Why should that not be treated as "taken"?
One more question remains to be answered. In the event that the
Federal Government makes the improvement, but the state owns the
technical fee, who is to compensate the riparian owner for his lost
access? The Federal Government which made, or the state which gets,
the reclaimed land?
The difficulty thus presented is perhaps not so formidable as it seems.
Clearly, compensation should be made by the one to whom the new land
goes. Since the state, although it did not make the improvement, gets
the land with all the value accruing from the right of access, it should
make compensation to the owner for the access taken away by force
of the ownership thus asserted. This result does not seem inconsistent
with legal principle. For the state, if it asserts title to the new-made
land, may well be treated as accepting the burden as well as the benefit.
If it refuses to accept the burden of compensating the owner for his
right of access, the state may properly be regarded as disclaiming title
to the reclaimed land, which the riparian owner should be permitted to
take. It is a fair choice.
In either event, the situation of the state has not been altered to its
prejudice. The state, ex hypothesi, having already. recognized the
owner's right of access, surely cannot object to paying for it if it takes
it with the new land. If the value of the new land with access does not
equal the value of access to the original riparian estate, then the state,
declining to take it, relinquishes to the riparian owner no more than it
has already in effect given him by recognizing access as a property
right.
In conclusion, it may be remarked that we have here one more illus-
tration of the impracticability of solving the concrete problems of every-
day life by a process of deduction from some general concept or
principle, whether that of seisin or any other. Even in this simple
matter we find a genuine, substantial, social and economic interest on
each side. Any solution by deduction must disappoint one or the other.
One of the interests, to be sure, is much greater than the other. But
that does not necessarily require the total sacrifice of the lesser. A
reasonable solution can apparently be reached by giving it legal recog-
nition, so far as "economically valid, and thereby bringing the two con-
flicting interests into fairly harmonious adjustment.
